Scenario
Two hooligans with something to prove drive at each other on a narrow road. The first to swerve loses faces among his peers. If neither swerves, however, a terminal fate plagues both.Description
There are two pure strategy equilibria in the game of chicken. A different pure strategy equilibrium is preferred by each player. Both equilibria are Pareto optimal. A mixed strategy equilibrium also exists.Example
Driver 2 | |||
stay | swerve | ||
Driver 1 | stay | -100,-100 | 1,-1 |
swerve | -1,1 | 0,0 |
General Form
Player 2 | |||
L | R | ||
Player 1 | U | a,w | b,x |
D | c,y | d,z |
b>d>c>a
y>z>x>w
updated: 1 September 2006
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© Mike Shor 2001-2006
© Mike Shor 2001-2006