Scenario
Two firms must simultaneously elect a technology to use for their compatible products. If the firms adopt different standards, few sales result. A common standard leads to higher sales. One technology is significantly preferred by consumers over the other. Thus, if the companies can standardize on the preferred technology, each obtains maximal profits. This is also called a Pareto coordination game.Description
There are two pure strategy equilibria. Both firms prefer the same equilibrium which Pareto dominates the other. A mixed strategy equilibrium also exists.Example
Firm 2 | |||
good | bad | ||
Firm 1 | good | 5,5 | 0,0 |
bad | 0,0 | 3,3 |
General Form
Player 2 | |||
L | R | ||
Player 1 | U | a,w | b,x |
D | c,y | d,z |
a>d>b; a>d>c
w>z>y; w>z>x
updated: 12 August 2005
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© Mike Shor 2001-2006
© Mike Shor 2001-2006